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Abstract 
The prevention of high-impact low-probability (HILP) events in industrial clusters or complex 
industrial areas where critical infrastructures are present critically depends on the presence and 
the performance of safety barriers that may have the potential to prevent escalation. In recent 
years a set of tools and models were developed for the quantitative assessment of risk due to 
cascading events and domino scenarios. The aim of the present study is the integration of tools 
for risk assessment with a specific approach allowing a detailed assessment of safety barrier 
performance. A LOPA (layer of protection analysis) based methodology, aimed at the definition 
and quantification of safety barrier performance in the prevention of escalation was developed. 
The method allowed the quantitative characterization of alternative mitigated and unmitigated 
escalation scenarios. Data were collected on the more common types of safety barriers aimed at 
the prevention of fire escalation. An example of application was developed, allowing the 
quantitative assessment of risk mitigation of cascading events triggered by fire escalation based 
on the assessment of safety barrier performance. 
 
1. Introduction 
The specific feature of escalation caused by fires is the time lapse which exists between the start 
of secondary events with respect to the start of the primary fire. This time lapse is usually 
indicated as time to failure (ttf) (Landucci et al. 2009a). In fact, while equipment damage caused 
by overpressure or fragments projection is almost instantaneous (Lees 1996, Tugnoli et al. 2014), 
the damage mechanism of equipment exposed to fire is such that time is needed before the 
temperatures of the shell and of the internal fluid are able to jeopardize the structural integrity of 
the target vessels (Landucci et al. 2009b). The ttf represents a key parameter to describe the 
resistance of equipment to external fires and depends on both the characteristics of the primary 
fire scenarios and the features of the secondary equipment involved in the fire (Khan & Abbasi 
1999, Lees 1996).  
In most cases, both factors may be modified by the installation of mitigation barriers and by 
appropriate emergency measures. The awareness of the hazards posed by domino effect led to 
the introduction of several technical standards that recommend the use of protective systems or 
barriers to reduce the possibility of fire escalation. 
Cascading events and domino scenarios caused by the escalation of industrial fires were 
responsible of severe accidents in chemical and Oil&Gas industrial facilities (Cozzani et al. 
2009, Khan & Abbasi 1999, AIChE CCPS 2000). Past accident data analysis shows that the 
secondary targets more frequently affected by escalation were pressurized tanks, atmospheric 
tanks, process vessels and pipelines (Reniers & Cozzani 2013, Darbra et al. 2010). Therefore, an 
accurate assessment of escalation probability needs to include the analysis of the available fire 
protection systems and safety barriers (AIChE CCPS 2001a) of such process items. However, an 
exhaustive approach to the quantitative assessment of the performance of all categories of 
protection layers (passive, active, procedural) relevant to the prevention or mitigation of fired 
domino effect is still lacking.  
The present study aims at the integration of a systematic quantitative analysis of safety barrier 
performance with probabilistic models for the assessment of escalation developed in previous 
studies (Landucci et al. 2009a). A methodology to assess the performance of safety barriers in 
the prevention of escalation was developed. The performance of active, passive and procedural 
safety barriers was assessed considering both availability and effectiveness, by adopting a LOPA 
(layer of protection analysis) approach. Equipment vulnerability models based on probit 
functions (Lees 1996) were integrated with the LOPA results. Modified escalation probabilities, 
including the influence of safety barriers, were thus obtained. The approach allowed assessing 
the reduction in escalation probability provided by each protection layer as well as by the overall 
system of safeguards implemented. The application to a case-study allowed the exploration of 
the features and potentialities of the methodology. 
 
2. Theoretical approach 
2.1 Procedure for the assessment of escalation probability accounting for safety barriers 
The methodology developed to integrate safety barrier performance in the escalation probability 
assessment is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Overview of the methodology. 
 
The first and preliminary step is aimed at gathering information about the equipment item under 
analysis and the primary fire scenario affecting the equipment and potentially triggering the 
domino chain.  
The second step consists in the identification and classification of the safety barriers available to 
prevent fire escalation on the equipment item of interest (Lees 1996, AIChE CCPS 2001a).  
As third step, a quantitative assessment of safety barrier performance should be carried out, 
obtaining barrier availability and effectiveness. This step is detailed in Section 3.  
In the final step, an event tree is built to assess escalation probability with respect to each 
equipment item classified as a relevant secondary target, also considering the action of safety 
barriers. A top-down approach starting from the primary fire (e.g., pool fire, torch or jet fire, etc.) 
affecting the target is adopted to obtain the event tree. The characterization of the primary fire is 
needed as a preliminary step to the quantification of the event tree: it requires to determine the 
expected duration of the primary fire, the heat load and the type of exposure (distant radiation, 
partial impingement or full engulfment). Intermediate events related to the performance of safety 
barriers are then defined using specific logic gates and operators.  
Event tree quantification allows accounting for the probability of unmitigated escalation and, if 
relevant, of one or more partially mitigated or delayed escalation scenarios. Being aware that the 
type of fire protection systems strongly depends on the features of the site and equipment under 
analysis, a repository of data for safety barriers frequently applied to prevent escalation triggered 
by fire was prepared in order to support and to demonstrate the application of the proposed 
methodology. 
 
2.2 Classification of standard technical safety barriers 
Different types of safety barriers are effective in delaying or preventing escalation. The three 
categories (De Dianous & Fievez 2006, AIChE CCPS 2001b)  of i) active protection systems, ii) 
passive protection systems and iii) procedural and emergency measures were taken into account 
according to different procedures in the quantitative assessment of escalation probability. 
Active fire protection systems more relevant in escalation prevention can be divided into two 
different categories (Lees 1996, Dennis & Nolan 1996, De Dianous & Fievez 2006): 
a) Systems for the delivery of fire-fighting agents (such as water or water-based foam), which are 
designed to mitigate fire exposure of the target or to provide effective control of the primary fire 
and prevention of fire spread in nearby units; 
b) Emergency Shutdown Systems (ESD) and Emergency Depressurization Systems (EDP), which 
are designed to isolate and empty the target vessel, reducing the potential loss and consequent 
damage connected to the large inventory. 
In the framework of escalation prevention, the application of fireproofing materials constitute 
a relevant and effective passive safety barrier aimed to delay the increase of the vessel wall 
temperature (Gomez-Mares et al. 2012a, b). Pressure Safety Valves (PSVs) are a further widely 
applied passive safety barrier to limit the vessel internal pressure by the control of the vapor 
pressure increase due to the raise of the liquid temperature. More details on the performance of 
PFP systems and on the underlying fundamental phenomena are reported elsewhere (Lees 1996, 
Droste & Schoen 1988, Landucci et al. 2009b). 
Procedural measures include the relevant operating procedures with respect to escalation 
prevention. Emergency measures represent the coordinated response to a major accident 
scenario, in which different roles and functions are to be performed by different actors (local 
authorities, fire brigade, emergency teams, etc.) (Lees 1996, TNO 2004). 
 
2.3 Assessment of safety barriers success probability 
The quantitative assessment of safety barrier performance is routinely carried out by standard 
assessment techniques as the layer of protection analysis (LOPA) approach. However, the 
specific framework of escalation prevention requires a tailorized approach to be developed. 
In the present study, the evaluation of safety barriers performance was aimed at quantifying: 
- availability, defined as the probability of failure on demand (PFD) of the safety barriers; 
- effectiveness, defined as the probability that the safety barrier, once successfully activated, will 
be able to prevent the escalation.  
The quantification of effectiveness, not carried out in a standard LOPA assessment, is of 
particular importance in the assessment of escalation prevention, since several barriers are 
known to be able to delay but not to prevent escalation. 
 
2.4 Calculation of escalation probability 
Considering the application in the framework of a conventional QRA, a modified event tree 
analysis (Schüller et al. 1997) was selected to consider the actual performance of the safety 
barrier. For any type of equipment item exposed to a primary fire, an event tree may be built to 
describe all the possible events in the case of success and/or failure of the implemented safety 
barriers. Intermediate events related to the performance of safety barriers were defined as parts 
of the event trees.  
More specifically, three specific gates and associated operators, shown in Figure 2 were used to 
consider the actual availability and effectiveness of safety barriers: 
a) a simple composite probability (gate type “a”): availability, expressed as the probability of 
failure on demand, is multiplied by a single probability value expressing the probability of 
barrier success in the prevention of the escalation; 
b) a composite probability distribution (gate type “b”): availability, expressed as the probability of 
failure on demand, is multiplied by a probability distribution expressing the probability of barrier 
success in the prevention of escalation, thus obtaining a composite probability of barrier failure 
on demand; 
c) a discrete probability distribution (gate type “c”): depending on barrier effectiveness, three or 
more events may originate from the gate describing barrier performance: barrier success (no 
escalation), barrier failure (unmitigated escalation), and one or more partially mitigated scenarios 
(partial or delayed escalation).  
The quantification of the event tree based on the specific gates illustrated in Figure 2 allowed the 
straightforward calculation of the final probability of escalation. It is worth to remark herein that 
the data needed for the quantitative assessment of the event tree and to apply the logic operators 
shown in Figure 2 are specific of the barrier assessed and may also be influenced by site-specific 
procedures related to barrier degradation and/or maintenance. Section 3 reports a repository of 




Figure 2. Definition of gate types and associated operators. PFD: probability of failure on 
demand; η: efficiency; Pd: equipment failure probability; M: number of possible final scenarios 
for type “c” gate. 
 
 
3. Safety barrier performance assessment 
3.1 Data repository 
A specific availability and effectiveness analysis was carried out for protection systems against 
fire escalation. Data repository is based on the identification of Reference Installations (RIs) 
which are categories of installations where common standards or practice apply to the selection 
and design of fire protection barriers, and of macro-categories of reference target equipment 
within each RIs. Identified RIs included refinery tank farms, LPG storage facilities and offshore 
Oil&Gas rigs for hydrocarbon extraction. Table 1 reports a data repository based on the 
collection of specific technical documentation and standards. More details on data collection are 




3.2 Active barriers 
Since active fire protections are complex systems, the evaluation of PFD, and thus of system 
availability, was achieved through the application of fault tree analysis (FTA) (Lees 1996, 
Schüller et al. 1997), which requires a detailed knowledge of the system components and 
architecture. 
The “beta factor method” (Schüller et al. 1997) was used for taking into account dependency and 
common cause failure assuming a constant value of β = 5%. Further details on the reliability data 
values selected for the analysis and their sources together with the FTA results and their 
validation for each system considered can be found elsewhere (Argenti & Landucci 2014).  
The successful activation of active fire protection systems does not guarantee that the escalation 
is actually prevented. Hence, the evaluation of system effectiveness through quantitative 
parameters was required to finalize the analysis of the performances of foam-water sprinkler 
systems and water deluge systems. 
Table 1. Repository of PFD and effectiveness for the protection systems considered in the 
present study.  
Protection 
system Gate type 
PFD 




sprinkler system b 5.43×10
-3 0.954 Atmospheric vessel 
WDS  a 4.33×10-2 1 LPG vessels  
WDS  a 2.24×10-2 1 Horizontal separators 
ESD  
system a 3.72×10
-4 1 Horizontal separators 
Pressure Safety 
Valve (PSV) a 1×10-2 1 Any 
Fireproofing  
coating a 1×10-3 1 Any 
Emergency 
intervention c 1×10
-1 0;1* Any 
* Depending on the comparison between ttf and tfm 
 
For sprinkler systems, a conservative value of effectiveness was derived from sprinkler systems 
performance data and statistics, such as the ones compiled by the US National Fire Protection 
Association, the Australian Fire Protection Agency, the UK Fire Offices’ Committee and other 
national authorities (see extended set of references provided by Landucci et al., 2015).  
Sprinkler systems effectiveness parameter (namely, η) was defined as the probability of success 
in controlling the primary fire, i.e. the fraction of case histories in which correct activation of the 
system resulted in effective action in controlling the fire: the lowest value reported in the 
literature (η = 0.954) was selected. A gate type “b” was thus associated to sprinkler systems in 
escalation event trees (see Fig. 2 for the use of PDF and η in gate type “b”). 
In order to quantify the effectiveness of water deluge systems (WDS), the numerical parameter 
φ, which represents  the reduction in the heat load due to heat radiation (QHL) obtained due to the 
presence of the activated deluge system, was introduced. Through the parameter φ, the reduced 
heat load in case of WDS effective activation (QWDS) is estimated as follows: 
HLWDS QQ ×=ϕ           (1) 
A conservative φ value of 0.5 (corresponding to a 50 % reduction to the incident heat load on the 
vessel) was selected on the basis of the results of the experimental studies conducted by Shirvill 
(2004), Roberts (2004), Hankinson & Lowesmith (2004) to investigate the performance of WDS 
in protecting horizontal pressurized vessels. A gate type “a” (see Fig. 2) was associated to the 
presence of WDS in escalation event trees. In case of failure of WDS system, the full heat load is 
supposed to affect the Reference Target Equipment; on the contrary, in case of WDS availability, 
a value of η equal to 1 is considered and the heat load is reduced of 50 %. Both mitigated and 
unmitigated heat load values were then implemented in specific correlations for the assessment 
of the time to failure of the target equipment (see Eq. 2 and Section 3.3). 
Since the ESD system activates in order to stop the leakage that feeds the primary fire, the 
effectiveness of this ESD system is related to system maximum response time. Also in this case 
gate type “a” was considered (see Fig. 2): in case of successful activation of the safety barrier, an 
isolation time of 3 minutes (AIChE CCPS 2000, Lees 1996) and efficiency equal to 1 (η=1, see 
Fig. 2) were assumed. 
 
3.3 Passive barriers 
Passive protection systems perform a mitigation action: in particular, they reduce the physical 
effects induced by the fire exposure on the target, which result in an increase in the time to 
failure (ttf).  
Concerning availability, the order of magnitude of the PFD was conservatively derived from 
specific literature on LOPA (AIChE CCPS 2001b). Concerning effectiveness, this parameter was 
evaluated for PFP as the degree by which the target resistance is enhanced due to PFP presence 
through the calculation of the ttf of the protected vessel. The gate type “a” was adopted for 
passive fire protections (see Fig. 2). In case of failure of PFP systems, the ttf was estimated as a 
function of the heat load by the use of simplified correlations for vessels integrity expressed in 
the following form: 
( )fQecVttf HLd ++×= )ln(exp0167.0        (2) 
in which ttf is expressed in minutes, QHL is the heat load (kW/m2) actually received by the target 
equipment (which may be substituted by QWDS in presence of effective activation of WDS 
system, see Eq. 1), V is the vessel volume (m3). The coefficients (c, d, e, f) are reported in Table 
2 for the more common types of process and storage equipment. 
 
Table 2. Summary of the coefficients used in the time to failure (ttf) correlations 
Item Coefficients for Equation 2 f e d c 
Pressurized 
vessel  0 -0.95 0.032 8.845 
Atmospheric 





Since previous studies (Droste & Schoen 1988, Di Padova et al. 2011, Landucci et al. 2009b, 
Tugnoli et al. 2012) demonstrated that the presence of a PSV alone is not sufficient to delay 
significantly the target time to failure, the unprotected vessel time to failure correlation given in 
Eq. 2 was conservatively applied also in the cases of available PSV with unitary efficiency. 
On the contrary, since the presence of a protective fireproofing layer showed to be able of 
delaying the vessel failure, in case of availability of this barrier an efficiency equal to 1 was 
considered and a further term (namely ttfc) was added to the ttf estimated for the unprotected 
vessel as follows: 
cp ttfttfttf +=           (3) 
where ttfp is the time to failure in presence of thermal protection. A simplified assessment of ttfc 
is proposed herein: a conservative value  of 70 minutes is used if high performance materials 
(such as intumescent coatings, vermiculite spray and fibrous mineral wool) specifically designed 
to withstand severe fire conditions are adopted. On the opposite, if common insulating materials 
(glass wool, rock wool, etc.) not designed for fireproofing applications are used for equipment 
protection, ttfc is set equal to zero.  
 
3.4 Procedural barriers 
In case of fire, emergency response can be provided by internal and/or external emergency teams 
(Lees 1996,  AIChE CCPS 2001a). These teams can be composed of experts or fire-fighters as 
well as of volunteers or workers who receive a specific training. Hence, the PFD of emergency 
team intervention might vary depending on the skills and the level of preparedness of emergency 
responders (Lees 1996, AIChE CCPS 2001a, De Dianous & Fievez 2006). However, in the 
present study the PFD was estimated using the conservative value associated to human errors in 
LOPA literature (AIChE CCPS 2001b).  
The effectiveness of emergency team response was quantified defining a time scale for 
emergency intervention that was used for a direct comparison with the time available for 
mitigation, represented by the time to failure (ttf) of the target vessel. Three reference times were 
defined: 
• tta (time to alert): maximum time required to start the emergency operations, defined as the time 
needed for the fire to be detected and the alarm to be given;  
• tsm (time to on-site mitigation): maximum time required to start the pre-planned response actions 
to be put in place by personnel and with resources available on site; 
• tfm (time for final mitigation): characteristic time of an effective intervention of external 
emergency teams, defined as the maximum time required by the external emergency team to 
provide and keep constant, by means of suitable equipment and vehicles, the amount of water 
which is required for primary fire suppression or effective cooling action on the target. 
For the sake of brevity, reference values were adopted herein to quantify the tta and tsm of each 
reference installation (RI), as derived from surveys and fire brigade guidelines (Hobert & Molag 
2006) and reported in Table 3. However, it is worth to remark that these parameters are site-
specific and need to be assessed for the site considered. 
A simplified calculation procedure is proposed to the assessment of the time for final mitigation 
(tfm). The procedure focuses on the calculation of the required amount of water for mitigation, 
which is one of the predominant factors affecting the value of tfm (Hobert & Molag 2006). 
Two different relationships were used to estimate the required amount of water depending on the 
firefighting strategy adopted in preventing escalation: Eq. 4 is proposed to describe the case of 
intervention aimed to directly suppress the primary fire, while Eq. 5 is proposed to consider the 
target exposure protection strategy: 
fireSw AwG ×=            (4) 
SFAwG ettEPw ××= arg          (5) 
where Gw =  amount of water required for primary fire suppression;  Afire (m2) = area of pool 
surface, or any other surface characteristic of the fire geometry; Atarget (m2) = cross sectional area 
of the target vessel; wEP = 12.2 L min-1 m-2 (NFPA 2009) required water application density for 
target exposure protection; ws = 10.0 L min-1 m-2 (NFPA 2009) required water application 
density for fire suppression; and SF = 3 safety factor (Hobert & Molag 2006). Then, the overall 
time lapse required to provide and keep constant the prescribed amount of water was calculated 
as the sum of literature values for: 
- time to alert external emergency team; 
- time to redirect call, time for fire fighters turn-out and driving time, which can be referred to as 
an overall response time; 
- time to carry out equipment deployment and other extra set-up operations, which depends on the 
type and number of fire fighting vehicles involved in the operations.  
Clearly enough, in the case of offshore platforms, tfm was set equal to tsm because no additional 
time is required for water supply and deliver apart from fire-fighting equipment deployment 
time, and no external aid is contemplated in emergency plans nor can be provided in a 
reasonably short lapse of time.  
In order to establish the value of barrier effectiveness, the tfm value was compared to the ttf of 
each target. The gate type “c” was used in the escalation event tree for procedural barriers 
involving emergency team intervention (see Fig. 2). The following three alternative scenarios 
were identified: 
- OUT1: if the emergency response is not activated or not available, the escalation will occur; 
- OUT2: the emergency response is activated but tfm results higher than ttf; in other words, 
emergency team actions come too late to prevent escalation (η=0) and a mitigated scenario 
result;  
- OUT3: the emergency response is activated and tfm is lower than ttf, so the mitigation action is 
successful and the fire escalation prevented (η=1). 
In order to quantify the gate output for gate type “c”, according to the operator described in 
Figure 2, the estimation of fired equipment damage probability (Pd) is needed together with 
external emergency team availability and effectiveness.  
 
Table 3. Suggested values for time parameters characterizing emergency response and evaluated 
probit coefficients for Eq. 6, in which ttf is expressed in minutes. 
Parameter Refinery tank farm LPG storage facility Offshore installation 
tta (min) 5 5 3 
tsm (min) 20 20 10 
tfm (min) Calculated (Section 3.4) Calculated (Section 3.4) tfm = tsm 
Probit coefficient a 9.261 9.261 8.616 
Probit coefficient b -1.85 -1.85 -2.126 
 
It is worth to notice that at this point of the event sequence, the target equipment damage 
probability is a function of the actual target equipment fire exposure conditions resulting from 
the primary fire. The effects of primary fire might have been mitigated to a certain extent by the 
installed active and passive protection systems, already taken into account in the development of 
the event tree. 
The values of parameters tta and tsm related to the effectiveness of internal procedural measures 
were used in the determination of the coefficients of probit functions that allow to obtain Pd as a 
function of the ttf (expressed in minutes), following the approach presented by Landucci et al. 
(2009a): 
)ln(ttfbaY +=           (6) 
where Y is the probit value which allows to directly obtain Pd and a, b are the probit coefficients. 
Table 3 reports the coefficients to be applied in Eq. 2 and 6 for the identified reference 
installations (RIs). 
It is worth to remind that the performance data obtained during the present study were gathered 
from the analysis of literature sources and from fault tree analysis based on generic reliability 
data for the single components of safety barriers. Therefore, the use of site specific data, when 
available, is strongly suggested to improve the estimates. Nonetheless, these data can be used as 
benchmark values to assess the expected performance. 
 
4. Case-Study definition 
Fire escalation probability assessment based on expected safety barrier performance data 
reported in the present study was carried out considering a sample layout derived from that of an 
existing storage tank park located in the premises of refinery. The layout is shown in Figure 3.  
 








Figure 3. Layout considered in the case study and heat radiation contours (in kW/m2) associated 
to the jet fire from tank T1. 
 
In order to simplify the case study, only two equipment items are considered: the pressurized 
tank T1, storing LPG and the atmospheric tank T2, containing gasoline. The relevant data on the 
equipment items present in the layout are summarized in Table 4, which exemplifies the level of 




Table 4. Features of the equipment considered for the case study. The layout is reported in 
Figure 3. 
Item Tank T1 Tank T2 
Type Pressurized Atmospheric 
Substance Propane Gasoline 
Capacity (m3) 25 407 
Diameter (m) 2.2 12 
Length/height (m) 6 3.6 
 
A 10-mm equivalent diameter leak from tank T1 is supposed to cause a jet fire impacting on tank 
T2. In order to simplify the case study, only one release position and the orientation were 
considered. The frequency of the primary scenario was assumed equal to 5×10-6 y-1, as derived 
from Purple Book (Uijt de Haag & Ale 1999). The consequences of jet fire were evaluated using 
conventional literature integral models (Lees 1996). A single set of meteorological parameters 
and a uniform wind direction were to calculate the consequences of the jet fire (wind velocity of 
5m/s, stability class D) for the sake of simplicity. According to the heat flux contours shown in 
Figure 3, vessel T2 is exposed to a heat load of 60kW/m2.  
The relevant safety barriers considered in the analysis were: i) foam-water sprinkler systems; ii) 
pressure relief valve; and iii) emergency teams intervention.  
 
 
5. Results and Discussion 
The escalation event tree shown in Figure 4 was drawn for the tank T2 (see Fig. 3); then, the 
quantification of its branches was carried out applying the operators shown in Figure 2 and using 
the reference performance data concerning the safety barriers listed above and the installation 
type “refinery”, as summarized in Tables 1-3. 
The tfm parameter was calculated in accordance with the simplified calculation procedure 
described in Section 3.3. More specifically, it was considered that emergency teams would give 
support in providing sufficient target exposure protection and cooling. A required water rate of 
about 600 m3/h was derived by applying Eq. 5. Hence, it was therefore reasonable to assume that 
the refinery water main could provide the required water rate, as long as two fire engines reach 
the fire area. The tfm value was calculated as equal to 32 minutes by summing up the time to 
alert the external emergency teams (5 minutes as given in Table 3) and fire engines arrival and 
deployment time (12 minutes and 15 minutes respectively), as derived from (Hobert & Molag 
2006).  
Several final outcomes were identified, deriving from all possible combinations of success and 
failure of implemented safety barriers. The frequency of occurrence of all the identified scenarios 
are reported in Table 5. 
 
 
Figure 4. Event tree for the probabilistic assessment of domino events resulting from jet fire 
impingement on T2 considering the action of relevant safety barriers.  
 
Table 5. Probabilistic assessment of final domino events for target T2. UD = unmitigated 














1.1 4.98×10-5 2.49×10-10 UD 
1.2 4.48×10-4 2.24×10-9 MD 
2.1 4.93×10-3 2.47×10-8 MD 
2.2 4.44×10-2 2.22×10-7 MD 
3.1 4.25×10-5 2.12×10-10 MD 
3.2 3.82×10-4 1.91×10-9 MD 
4.1 4.21×10-3 2.10×10-8 MD 
4.2 3.79×10-2 1.89×10-7 MD 
  
If safety barriers were not considered as in simplified literature approaches (Landucci et al. 
2009a), a time to failure of approximately 3 minutes would have been obtained for T2 and then 
used for the assessment of a provisional unmitigated escalation frequency equal to 4.87×10-6 y-1. 
According to the results of the case study, the frequency of occurrence of an unmitigated domino 
scenario (represented by the upper most branch of the event tree in  Fig. 4), showed a reduction 
of four orders of magnitude if the implementation of all relevant protection layers is instead 
considered. 
In the considered case-study, the interruption of domino chain was considered not possible. This 
was mainly due to the severe exposure condition to which atmospheric tank T2 was subjected, 
leading to an extremely short time to failure of targets compared to the time required by external 
emergency teams to provide a sufficient water rate. It can be observed that the major contribution 
to the frequency of domino scenarios (both mitigated and non-mitigated) was due to the 
frequency of mitigated scenarios (4.61×10-7 y-1). Therefore, a more realistic description of the 
actual escalation potential and a more precise estimate of related frequencies were allowed by 
accounting for safety barriers. In fact, applying the developed methodology it was possible to 
distinguish between mitigated and unmitigated final scenarios and to assess their credibility. 
Furthermore, it was possible to quantify the changes in the overall frequency of domino 
scenarios due to the presence and action of different protection layers. 
 
6. Conclusions 
A methodology for the probabilistic assessment of fire escalation leading to domino scenarios 
was developed taking into account the role of safety barriers. The methodology allowed 
considering the actual performance of safety barriers in preventing and mitigating escalation. A 
repository of reference data made available benchmark data for a comparison of actual to 
expected barrier performance. Finally, the analysis of a case study pointed out the importance of 
considering barrier performance in the evaluation of fire escalation probability in the assessment 
of domino scenarios, allowing for a more precise estimate of the frequency related to cascading 
events triggered by fire. 
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